The One Child Policy and Family Formation in Urban China

The Chinese government implemented the One Child Policy (OCP) in an attempt to ameliorate the population explosion and its potential negative economic consequences on their infant economy in 1979. Here the consequences of this policy for marital matching and family size decisions are examined. A simple General Equilibrium model demonstrates how constraints on marital output on the quantity of children dimension raises the marginal benefit of increased positive assortative matching, and greater investment in children. These theoretical predictions are examined empirically in a variety of ways. The prediction of intensified positive assortative matching was examined using Distributional Overlap and Stochastic Dominance Tests and provided support for intensified assortative matching amongst the urban population. To support this positive finding, we next examined if the policy was indeed binding. The extent to which parental family size decisions were bound by the OCP were examined using Poisson regression techniques and the results suggest that the OCP principally affected the quantity of children decision by suppressing parental preference for male heirs and they suggest that after the OCP was implemented births beyond the first child are purely accidental among younger mothers. In addition, we also found some evidence of increased educational attainment among children reflecting increased parental investments in children post OCP further supporting the view that the One Child Policy altered significantly familial decisions in urban China.Family Formation, Rationing, Matching

Making Inferences About Rich Country - Poor Country Convergence: The Polarization Trapezoid and Overlap measures.

Underlying the unresolved debate over whether the gap between rich and poor country GNP per capita has narrowed is a concern for wellbeing. The issue is really about the changing shapes of distributions of wellbeing indicators. As limiting cases con- vergence between rich and poor country groups can be brought about by countries within groups becoming less alike without any diminution of growth rate differentials between them or it can be brought about by reductions in these differentials without any diminution of within group identity. In essence the debate is about the extent to which rich and poor countries are polarizing, a subject first theoretically explored by Esteban and Ray (1994). The empirical issue is about whether separate groups can be identified in the overall distribution and whether they are tending toward common or distinct equilibria. This paper proposes two simple statistics for the problem, the Overlap measure and the Trapezoidal measure, changes in which reflect a combination of increasing (decreasing) subgroup location differences and decreasing (increasing) subgroup spreads which are the characteristics of polarization (convergence). The former statistic is of use when the sub-distributions are identified, while the latter can be used whether or not the subgroups are identified. These techniques are applied to the examination of convergence in GDP per capita between rich and poor nations when growth is viewed either as a wellbeing index or a technology index (i.e. the data are, or are not, population weighted). It turns out that such a distinction matters, viewed technologically there is divergence, viewed in a wellbeing sense there is convergence. As a collection of countries Africa is diverging from the rest of the world whatever the perspective of growth.Convergence, Polarization, Trapezoid Measure, Overlap measure

Qualified Equal Opportunity and Conditional Mobility: Gender Equity and Educational Attainmant in Canada

Interest in Economic and Social Mobility is rooted in a societal aspiration for equal opportunity. The aspiration is based upon an Egalitarian Political Philosophy which approves of differential outcomes when they are the consequence of differential effort and disapproves of differential outcomes when they are the consequence of differential circumstance and results in “level playing field” policies. In the absence of any other imperative, such policies would result in increased upward mobility for the poorly endowed and increased downward mobility for the richly endowed. Adding a Utilitarian imperative (the inheriting generation should not be made worse off in a first order dominance sense) to societal objectives results in a “Qualified Equal Opportunity or Conditional Mobility” policy which calls for rethinking the approach to mobility measurement. Techniques for evaluating the impact of such policies (both in terms of generational regressions and transition matrices) are proposed and exemplified in considering the issue of Gender Equity in educational attainment in Canada over the last 20 years. The evidence is that women have more than caught up with men and that, in closing the gap, it is the poorly endowed women who have made the most progress in terms of mobility whilst the mobility of males has remained relatively constant across the endowment spectrum consistent with a Qualified Equal Opportunity program.Mobility and Equal Opportunity

CAUSES OF MULTIFUNCTIONALITY: EXTERNALITIES OR POLITICAL PRESSURE

Resource /Energy Economics and Policy,

Agri-environmental Policy in the European Union: Who's in Charge?

The EU has argued that some agricultural subsidies are needed to provide the optimal amount of externalities (both positive and negative) produced by agriculture. The argument is that agriculture is "multifunctional" and externalities such as rural development and landscape would be underproduced, while some forms of pollution (such as nitrogen runoff) would be overproduced without government intervention. Meanwhile, the United States has raised the concern that multifunctionality is primarily an argument to transfer income to producers. One way to try and determine how much of these non-commodity payments are directed to externalities and how much is intended to distribute income to producers is to analyze the variation of the programs among the different member states of the EU. We estimate the degree to which environmental characteristics, agricultural characteristics and political economy variables determine the objective and amount of funding each member states uses to address environmental externalities (both positive and negative). Results indicate that little of the variance in agri-environmental expenditure can be explained by the difference in negative externalities, neither is there clear evidence that the payments are substituting for traditional agricultural subsidies. However, demand for environmental services and political variables seem to be the driving motivators behind a country's decision to spend money on agri-environmental programs.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Agri-environmental Policy in the European Union: Who's in Charge?

European Union (EU) agri-environmental programmes (AEPs) represent a significant step in the region's efforts to decouple agricultural output from production and export subsidies. While AEPs comprise only a small share of EU agricultural support, they have two possible external impacts: 1) the composition of the EU's imports and exports may change as their producers become more market responsive; and 2) the WTO's Green Box (subsides considered minimally trade distorting and hence not disciplined) may become increasingly contentious. Our concern is with the drivers of AEPs in the EU and their implications for Canada.Environmental Economics and Policy,

Burden Sharing and Public Good Provision: A Numerical Sensitivity Analysis

This paper reports on our numerical analysis of the model developed in Rausser-Simon 1991a and 1991b. We will assume that the reader is thoroughly familiar with the latter paper and refer frequently to the terminology introduced there. Two conclusions were readily apparent from the paper. First, many of the more interesting comparative statics questions we want to ask about the model are unlikely to have simple and determinate answers. In particular, it is especially difficult to determine the impact on alliance performance of certain kinds of changes in the spatial configuration and distribution of power within the alliance. The reason is that the fortunes of different alliance members are intertwined in highly intricate ways. Distributional changes set off a chain of conflicting events that are extremely difficult to disentangle

Political Economy of Alliances: Structure and Performance

In collective decision making, political alliances naturally arise and are critical to the negotiation processes that lead to the actual implementation of decisions. In the present context, an alliance refers simply to a group of political actors who share common, but not identical, interests against some adversary. In this paper we focus on the relationship among three constructs: the structure of an alliance, the context in which negotiations take place, and the performance of the alliance. The term alliance structure refers to the configuration of alliance members\u27 preferences as well as to their bargaining attributes. The context of negotiation refers to the rules of the bargaining game, including such factors as the structure of admissible coalitions and the range of allowable policy proposals. Alliance performance refers to the alliance\u27s effectiveness in furthering its members\u27 common objectives through the negotiation process. For example, if the space of issues can be represented in an Edgeworth box, a natural measure of alliance performance might be the location of the negotiated solution along the contract curve

International Trade Law

This course examines the process and substance of international trade law, focusing primarily on the law of the World Trade Organization and secondarily on the law of regional trade organizations and the foreign trade law of the United States. We will begin with an overview of issues relating to the concept of free trade, the institutionalization of international trade, the relationship between U.S. and international trade law, and WTO dispute settlement. Next, we will cover the legal principles and rules of international trade. Throughout the course, we will refer to economic and political debates and use analytical methods in these disciplines to augment our understanding of international trade law. A major objective of the course is to learn how to engage international trade law in a variety of different practice-oriented settings. Towards that end, this course feature case studies and case-based advocacy